It is easy today, with so much information out there about the horrors of atomic warfare, and so little remembrance of the actual history of the final stages of WWII, to be critical of the U.S. decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan.
Sadly, as a result, most Japanese are taught today that they were merely the victims of overwhelming American might, rather than the aggressors and instigators of war, and even more sadly, we are confronted with the shameful specter of anti-nuke, anti-war, anti-history Americans pathetically apologizing to the Japanese, misquoting history, and blindly ignoring the real facts behind the decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan.
In this book, Richard Frank sets about methodically re-creating the historical context of the end stages of WWII. He addresses virtually every controversial claim, every possible scenario, in the decision process that led to the atomic bombing. Other reviewers have mentioned several points already, and so I present only a summary of the major controversies dealt with in this book:
1. Why was it necessary to drop two atomic bombs or to use them on civilians? - The U.S. was afraid that Japan would think that its supply of atomic bombs was limited (and in fact, production was limited, but was steadily growing), and wanted to demonstrate to Japan that it had the ability and willpower to completely annihilate Japan with a series of atomic bombs. As it turns out, the U.S. calculations were correct. After Hiroshima was bombed, Frank points out that there was a faction in the Japanese military that had enough knowledge of the difficulty of uranium separation to deny the possibility that the U.S. could have developed such a bomb or claimed that the U.S. would not be able to keep up the atomic bombing, and used these arguments to continue to hold out against surrender. Other Japanese military leaders hoped that world opinion would bar the U.S. from further use of the atomic bombs on civilians. That the Japanese military doubted the willpower of the U.S. to use atomic bombs against civilians is proof that a mere demonstration on some unpopulated target would have been useless. Dropping two atomic bombs thus served to vaporize all of the final delusions of these fanatic military leaders.
2. Wasn't Japan close to surrender already because of the massive firebombing of its cities? The U.S. had destroyed over 60 Japanese cities already, killing over 100,000 in one raid on Tokyo alone. However, while this caused enormous suffering for Japanese civilians, the military elite ruling Japan couldn't care less, and continued to hold out for a final land battle, intending to inflict enormous casualties on any U.S. invasion. Their calculation was that the U.S., a democracy with freedom of the press and freedom of speech that even then was extremely sensitive to casualties, could be forced to offer a negotiated surrender with better terms (see no. 5 below for more on this) instead of unconditional surrender. One thing that Frank does not emphasize enough is that subsequent firebombings after Tokyo killed far fewer people per raid, as the Japanese learned how to deal with the firebombing better. A significant factor in the success of the firebombing was the nature of the highly flammable wooden cities of Japan. However, neither firebombing nor the inaccurate conventional bombing of that era would have had much impact on the dispersed and hidden armed forces of the Ketsu-Go operation (the Japanese plan for a massive suicidal countering of an American invasion on the island of Kyushu). Ketsu-Go versus the atomic bomb would have been a completely different story. The general in charge of Ketsu-Go happened to have his headquarters in Hiroshima, and after surviving the atomic bombing and seeing its effects, he bluntly told Hirohito that he could not be sure anymore that his forces would be able to fend off an invasion. IMHO, it was this realization by the military that Ketsu-Go would fail in the face of the atomic bomb that was the key in forcing the military to accept defeat without an invasion. And it was this realization by Hirohito that the military would accept his "command" to accept unconditional surrender that encouraged this timid personality to finally step in and "command" surrender (Frank gives some more convoluted reasons that I think are less convincing. He does not emphasize enough that Hirohito had no legal authority at the time to force the military to do anything - Hirohito's power was entirely based on tradition, respect, and superstitious symbolism - and in fact the military fanatics had a history of assassinating advisors to Hirohito whenever it seemed that he was favoring a course of action that they did not like).
3. Weren't the estimated potential U.S. casualties in an invasion grossly inflated? Perhaps they were, but first of all, if you are an American and think that ANY number of dead American soldiers in an invasion of Japan would have been worth trading in return for not using the atomic bomb, then you need to have your citizenship revoked. And if you are Japanese, and believe that a U.S. invasion would have been preferable to atomic bombing, then you really don't understand the fanaticism of the military elite that was in control at the end of the war. At Saipan and Okinawa, the local Japanese citizenry had been recruited into the battles and had suffered enormous casualties. Even worse was being planned for an invasion of the Japanese homeland, with the entire civilian population given bamboo sticks and suicide bombs which they were expected to use against U.S. soldiers. Frank calculates that the civilian casualties in an invasion of Japan would have far exceeded what was suffered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In addition, U.S. intelligence eventually revealed that preparations for Ketsu-Go were so extensive that chances for a successful invasion were becoming increasingly uncertain. American casualties would have almost certainly been enormous. While General MacArthur blithely swept all of that intelligence under the rug, and continued to insist on the original invasion plans, Admiral Nimitz was on the verge of going on the record opposing the invasion when the atomic bombs were dropped. This book makes clear that a U.S. invasion of Kyushu, led by the over-confident MacArthur, could have well been a complete disaster.
4. Wouldn't a blockade and continued bombing of Japan have forced a surrender? - Yes, but it would have taken a much longer period of time, at a minimum of several more months, and resulted in enormously greater loss of life to others besides U.S. soldiers. Frank points out that by attacking Japan's railway systems and vital coastal shipping, the U.S. could have easily shut down all food distribution in the country. However, again, because the Japanese warlords did not care about the suffering of the civilian population, it is likely in such a scenario that they would have held out for so long that Japanese deaths from starvation would have easily exceeded the deaths from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Plus there were also the vastly greater numbers of deaths that would have occurred in the countries that had been invaded by Japan, people who would have continued to die under a brutal occupation. There would also have been much greater numbers of deaths amongst Allied POWs. The numbers calculated by Frank are truly staggering, and make clear that atomic bombing to force a surrender was by far the least of all evils in terms of total numbers of dead people. Frank also recounts the massive atrocities committed by the Japanese in WWII. Yep, after you read these sections (the atrocities mentioned included dissecting and drilling holes into the brains of captured, living American airmen, among other niceties), you might also look more favorably upon atomic bombing Japan. Let's face it, this was a war without mercy, and the Japanese, who were merciless in their treatment of their enemies, had no right to expect any. Nevertheless, after the surrender, Japan did receive mercy, in the form of massive shipments of food from America to their starving civilians.
5. Wouldn't a negotiated surrender, as demanded by the military warlords, have been preferable to atomic bombing? No, first and foremost, up until the atomic bombings, the Japanese militarist faction simply refused to consider surrender under any conditions. They wanted an invasion and a chance at redemption of national honor with their Ketsu-Go operation. The peace faction's best efforts consisted of delusional hopes that Russia could somehow broker a negotiated settlement. Even AFTER both atomic bombs had been dropped, and Russia had declared war on Japan, the militarist faction continued to hold out briefly for a negotiated surrender with three additional terms besides maintenance of the emperor (which the peace faction also wanted): a short occupation by a minimal force, demobilization of Japanese troops by Japanese officers, and trying of war criminals by Japanese courts (Frank does not mention these details in his book - they are contained in another book "The Day Man Lost Hiroshima"). Acceptance of such conditions would have resulted in only a temporary cease-fire, much like the treaty of Versailles had been for WWI. It would not have removed the basic root causes that led Japan to attack East Asia and America - the institutions and ideology of an intensely nationalistic and fanatic military elite that put national honor and pride above everything else, including common sense. This bitter lesson from WWI, that the military elites and institutions of Germany and Japan needed to be completely eradicated in order to ensure lasting peace with those nations, was what caused Roosevelt to demand unconditional surrender. Roosevelt did not want the sacrifice of the lives of so many soldiers to be in vain, as it had been for WWI.
In summary, people critical of the atomic bombing of Japan simply fail to grasp just how difficult it was at that time for the U.S. and the peace faction in Japan to force an increasingly delusional military elite that was fanatically committed to national honor and pride to give up all of their institutions of power without first completely immolating their country. Read this book, read it carefully, and you WILL understand.
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- Edgar R WagnerReviewed in the United Kingdom on October 7, 2020
Downfall. The end of Imperial Japan in 1945. Richard B Frank
Format: PaperbackVerified Purchase - David I. WalkerReviewed in the United Kingdom on March 16, 2017
Highly Recommended - Tells some harsh truths about August 1945 , that should be better known ...
Format: PaperbackVerified Purchase - chasmackReviewed in Canada on February 1, 2025
Detailed look at the run up to the end of war in pacific
Format: PaperbackVerified Purchase - The Silent HeroReviewed in Canada on December 31, 2017
Well written coverage about the end of WW2
Format: PaperbackVerified Purchase - Nicholas RobinsonReviewed in Canada on June 4, 2024
Type So Small You'll Need A Scanning Electron Microscope
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